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Response
Andrea Purdekova
Audiences around the world increasingly experience media technologies and mediascapes as a complicated repertoire of print, celluloid,
electronic media, and billboards, with complicated and interconnected
effects.1 Media technology enables, it forces and reshuffles, it misrepresents and leaves out. Anik satellite broadcasting allows an Inuit people
in the northern Canadian provinces to listen to their native language.
Internet and online news enable diasporic communities to maintain
contact with their homeland and preserve their long-distance solidarities, whether ethnic, national, or even continental. Media technologies
also force us to witness what we would perhaps rather forget and bury
deep down in our “social unconscious.” Just remind yourself of the
infamous Oliviero Toscani advertising campaign in which white nuns
were kissing black priests or the blood-stained clothes of a dead Bosnian soldier were on display around the world under the logo of Benetton. Last but not least, media technologies also blur the lines between
realistic and fictional landscapes, leading to constructions of imagined
worlds that are chimerical, aesthetic, even fantastic objects.
In this turmoil of disconnected effects, two notable issues transpire:
the agency of the media consumer, with his/her (in)ability to refuse,
moderate, and transform the media content served, and the inequalities in representation by the media and access to the media technologies. Aphra Kerr commences a vital discussion of these issues, and it is
my intent to move the discussion forward by spelling out the important silences of Dr. Kerr’s essay. Rather than as a criticism, my survey
of the “silenced” issues should be viewed as opening additional
avenues of exploration in the complex problematique at hand.
*****
In her essay, Kerr guides us through the complex interlinkages of
media technology, society, and globalization. One major contribution
lies in the problematization of four theoretical assumptions often
adopted by scholars in the field. First, Kerr opposes technological determinism, suggesting that just as technologies are able to shape society,
so also does society have the capacity to either accelerate or inhibit the
development of new technologies and their adaptation on a mass scale.
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Second, Kerr distances herself from the unwarranted optimism surrounding the roles and functions of technology, as such a confident,
positive attitude reflects a lack of recognition of perhaps a more negative side of media technology. Indeed, new mediascapes can, on the
one hand, be viewed as intensified cultural flows, memory banks of
culture and potential contestants of stereotypes, devices of visibility,
spaces for revolutionary activity, or shopping malls for alternative
selves. At the same time, mediascapes can be turned into devices of
misrepresentation and cultural homogenization, into magnifiers of
consumption and a new societal divide.
Third, Kerr suggests that the limits of technological propagation should
be acknowledged. Mediated experience must be set into the context of
real-life experience, of which it is only a small part. The lack of recognition of this restriction on the effects of technology inflates and homogenizes its effects.
Last, Kerr comments on the tendencies toward hyperbolic discourse
and historical amnesia that often pervade the discussions of technology
and globalization. People are inclined to see the present technological
change as unprecedented in scope and nature, when in fact what they
observe may not be a new artifact but simply a reconfiguration of
actors. Drawing on her view of globalization as processes rather than
eras, what we witness is changing terms, players, and power axes, yet
with the same hierarchies of power in place. What we do not witness is
a new society transformed by technology.
*****
The particular changes of which we are spectators, not only in the case
of Ireland but also internationally, are deregulation, media growth,
and the concentration of power in a small number of media moguls.
Kerr suggests that altogether these three factors give rise to commercialized media, in which the emphasis shifts from so-called “principled
pluralism” to a more pragmatic stance. That is, commercialized media
appeals to only a limited section of the audience and broadcasts a narrow range of programs. Both audiences and programs are thought of
primarily in financial terms, and diversity of content as well as the
public and cultural role of the media remain secondary. Commercial
media conglomerates tend to shift their reliance on national programs
to ones that are more internationally available. Consequently, “audiences tend to become more familiar with the sights and sounds of the
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backlots of Los Angeles [or in the case of Slovakia, also with life problems of innumerable characters from Latin American telenovelas] rather
than receiving representations of their own society and its concerns.”2
The main challenge that such transition brings, Kerr asserts, is how to
assure plurality of content, regardless of who owns the media corporation.
*****
Having briefly recounted the main contributions of Kerr’s essay, I now
turn to a few curious silences in the text, to their importance, and to the
new avenues of exploration that they open in our discussion of media
technology, society, and globalization.
One remarkable silence in the text concerns the demographic analysis
of technology propagation, whether in the world at large or, more specifically, in Ireland. Kerr reminds us that mediated experience is just a
fragment of real-life experience, but we do not hear who has the access
to modern technology, or where and to what extent they have it, or in
what ways this access has been changing over the years. Focusing predominantly on traditional media technologies such as television, cinema, and broadcasting, perhaps she did not deem it necessary. Despite
this likely rationale, attention should be given to the fact that “society”
does not represent a homogeneous unit.
The “digital divide” or “technological apartheid” is a stark reality,
especially if we consider the difference in access among developed and
developing countries. A panel of information technology experts commissioned by the United Nations reported that, “although there are
now more than 1.5 billion Web sites and billions of e-commerce dollars
flowing worldwide, less than five percent of the world’s population is
online.”3 I believe we all know who constitutes this 5 percent. Just to
refresh our common knowledge, the access is not only significantly
lower in developing countries (with most of that access accruing to the
elites) but there is also a growing disparity between the developed and
developing countries in terms of access.
Even in the U.S., however, the gap is not bridged. While the total
number of Americans buying computers and getting online increases
every day, there are still large segments of the society that are being
bypassed in the present Information Age. Penetration rates have risen
across all demographic groups and geographic areas.4 Nevertheless,
penetration levels currently differ, often substantially, according to
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income, educational level, race, household type, and geography,
among other demographic characteristics. The differences are most
prominent with respect to computers and Internet access, but apply to
other avenues of media technology as well. The following examples
highlight the breadth of the digital divide today:
Those with a college degree are more than eight times as likely to have a
computer at home, and nearly sixteen times as likely to have home Internet access as those with an elementary school education. A high-income
household in an urban area is more than twenty times as likely as a
rural, low-income household to have Internet access. A child in a lowincome White family is three times as likely to have Internet access as a
child in a comparable Black family, and four times as likely to have
access as children in a comparable Hispanic household.5

Considering these statistics, it would be interesting to know what
the significant demographic divides are in Ireland in terms of information and media technology, and how these are presently changing.
Paying attention to the content of what is being propagated by the new
media technologies and to the actions on the part of audiences in
manipulating new technologies is significant, yet not sufficient. Many
people have more steps to take before they can trouble themselves
over content and ponder the ways in which to manipulate technologies.
*****
Let me now explore a related issue, the problem of diversity of content
and new multinational corporations. Kerr suggests that concentration
of ownership becomes a problem because the quality, diversity, and
services offered do not accommodate the cultural and political diversity of the audience while local and state-based media corporations do.
First of all, the implicit assumption is that new media content suppliers
affect the demand in the country without being considerably affected
by the already present tastes. Even though this is a highly disputable
issue, it must be acknowledged that many large corporations, such as
MTV, strive to become, not just in theory but in practice, “multilocal”
rather than multinational.6 To what extent plural tastes and interests
can be incorporated into the agenda of a multinational corporation is a
different question altogether. The general idea, however, is that in
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order to make profit, in order to constantly “reinvent itself, to lead and
reflect, create and capitalize on a particular market, it is vital that it [a
multinational company] provides a breeding ground for the national
and the local.”7
On the other side of the spectrum lie the local and the national,
which supposedly generate more diversity of content for their audiences. From my personal experience, I would disagree, and instead
propose that the local and national acknowledge different tastes and
needs, but only of a section of the society. For example, I don’t remember ever watching on Slovak National Television a program addressing the needs of the extensive Roma, Hungarian, or Ukrainian
minority.
To be sure, this is not an argument about the relative success of
multinational companies in comparison to local or national media corporations in providing sufficient plurality of media content. Both fail
to secure plurality in their own way. Rather than trying to find solutions in de- or re-regulation, perhaps we should focus more on the
agency of diverse audiences, whether as consumers of the mediated
product or, more importantly, as its producers. We witness how many
minority groups have been successful in manipulating audiovisual
technologies for their own causes — for the preservation of their cultures, for increasing their engagement with these cultures, or for more
explicit political goals. Examples include the Inuit of the Canadian
Arctic, the Zapatistas of southern Mexico, the Aborigines of Australia,
and the Maori of New Zealand. Many more minority groups all over
the world, however, and not just ethnically defined ones, have not yet
taken advantage of the audiovisual technologies of the broader society.
These minorities remain “doubly left out” in terms of access to as well
as representation in the media.
If one of the complex array of effects resulting from the present concentration of power in a few media conglomerates is the general
impoverishment of media content, then we should see increased cultural marginalization of more and more groups around the world,
now not merely at the national level but internationally. In that case, it
seems that manipulation of technology by the minorities and creation
of access pathways to such action would indeed be more effective than
re-regulation of the market, which, as Kerr points out, did not bring
increased plurality of content in the case of Ireland.
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*****
Leaving the questions of unequal access and content plurality aside,
one more remarkable silence in the essay struck me, namely, the role of
the government and political actors in the media technology and society interaction. Kerr offers a limited picture of the complex interaction
of players. She portrays the new drama as the interaction between
audiences (or consumers) and manipulators (or producers). The political actors have not been acknowledged as manipulators, even though
they seem to exert much power over the media, and, through the
media, over the audience.
Media and information technologies have always been important
channels of political communication to the masses. Today, perhaps
more than ever before, we are witnessing a strong confluence between
political power and media corporations. It is already a well-recognized
fact that “parties are increasingly turning, for the creation and diffusion of their image, to advertising agencies that are skilled in applying
the criteria of commercial propaganda to political communication.”8
The Italian political scientist Danilo Zolo, in his book Democracy and
Complexity, went as far as to suggest that in modern developed societies, mass media are the most central organizing principle of today’s
self-legitimizing liberal oligarchies, or what he calls “televisual democracies.”9 Danilo Zolo finds an individual trapped within a techno-oligarchic, hyper-real public space, governed by means of images. The
power of images, resulting from the impact of microelectronic information, communication, and entertainment media, creates a new axis
of power: the media information system or “mediocracy.” Mediocracy
is corporate-controlled, globalized, and hyper-real. A world dominated by “hypertexts,” without sufficient context, plus the corresponding collage effects, has a devastating effect on democracy.
As a result, Zolo postulates that the very nature of political communication through media is noninteractive and asymmetrical, nondirectional, and, in all-important respects, closed to dialogue. What has
become a “telecharismatic” public sphere is dominated by consumerspectators rather than citizens, by telegenic politicians and pundits,
and by “demoscopic agencies.” A key feature of this televisual democracy is the growing transformation of political campaigns into “metacampaigns” and of electorates into “metaelectorates.”10 Publicity
specialists, pollsters, and media pundits select the appropriate candidates and issues, and frame the boundaries of electoral competition.
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Public opinion assessors create a surrogate electorate more important
than the real one. The real voters see themselves replaced by their own
demoscopic and televisual projection, which anticipates them and
leaves them the passive observers of themselves. Such communication
breeds apathetic voters, conformity, “political silence,” and even the
spectacularization of politics.11
The work of Danilo Zolo is considered by many to be the most powerful and disturbing analysis of contemporary democracy and democratic theory. In short, Zolo maintains that neither pluralistic
competition nor citizens exist in contemporary mass democratic societies. This Hobbesian approach, which marginalizes human agency,
allows no space for democratic activity to take place. Furthermore, it
neglects the facts of unequal “wiring” to hyper-reality through which
mediocracy operates. Many of Zolo’s arguments are plausible in themselves, but how far can they be extended? Don’t we see in Zolo an
example of the theorist who inflates particular effects beyond their
reach? There are degrees of incorporation into the techno-oligarchic
system. Neglecting this fact means neglecting the “digital divide,”
which remains a powerful reality despite the attempts of G-7 “dot
forces”12 and bridging projects.
On the other hand, perhaps Zolo’s pessimistic outlook is more than
a frightening social science fiction. Perhaps there is something to be
feared in view of the increased confluence between media conglomerates and political actors, and, more generally, because of increasing permeation of numerous commercially based mediascapes into our lives.
We need to pay attention to this pessimistic scenario and reconcile it
with the hybridity thesis and the notion of the active audience.
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